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This study draws on networked framing and 
intermedia network agenda-setting theories to examine 
how different informational actors have framed the 
March for Our Lives gun control movement in 2018. 
This study uses the Social Science One Facebook URLs 
share dataset to compare network-agenda setting of 
different media types including offline news media, 
partisan sites, nonpartisan sites, advocacy/activism 
organizations, and social media/aggregate services. 
Results suggest that news media’s framing was the 
richest and most dynamic, suggesting their important 
roles in setting the gun issue as a salient public agenda. 
Meanwhile, emerging media expanded the scope of 
framing by covering race, gender, and equity issues into 
gun politics. The movement/activist organizational 
actors showed the least similarity to other media types, 
inviting further questions on the role of 
movement/activist actors in shaping public attention 
and agendas in the process.     
1. Introduction  
Social movements and protests are a vital part of 
participatory democracy, driving meaningful social 
change across the globe. The mainstreaming of protest 
culture in recent decades is partly attributed to digital 
networks due to their cost-effectiveness, speed of 
information transmission, and the decentralized 
mobilization of sympathizers and participants [1].  
Digital networks contribute to the shifting 
dynamics of three structural conditions underlying a 
successful collective action: framing structures (e.g., 
collective identities and slogans as framed in protest 
messages), resource mobilization structures (e.g., 
activism/movement organizational workings for 
recruitment and resource allocations), and opportunity 
structures (e.g., socio-political structural factors that 
restrain or promote participation) [2]. These three 
structural conditions work in tandem to fulfill two 
modes of mobilization: consensus mobilization, 
referring to spreading information and building morale 
conducive to participation; and action mobilization, 
referring to making people engage in tangible activities 
such as walkout, demonstration, petition, or donation [3]. 
It is widely agreed that digital networks catalyze both 
consensus and action mobilization by allowing activists 
to enhance their visibility and networking capacity, 
expand protest toolkits, and propagate protest slogans 
and symbols [1].  
This study focuses on consensus mobilization, a 
prerequisite for action mobilization [4]. What social 
movement scholars call consensus mobilization 
resonates with “public issue salience” (and the salience 
of the issue’s attributes) in media scholars’ language [5]. 
News media attention has been an important mechanism 
to raise public issue salience [5]. Accordingly, analyses 
of consensus mobilization have referred to the media 
industry’s information regimes such as newspaper 
subscriptions, availability of news stations, or frequency 
of news coverage [6,7]. In today’s networked 
environment, informational actors that contribute to 
shaping public issue salience during social movement 
have become diversified beyond traditional mass media 
[8].   
This study attempts to understand how consensus 
mobilization unveils in this diversified media landscape. 
Theoretically, this study borrows the lenses of 
“networked framing” [9,10] and “intermedia network 
agenda-setting” [8,11], both of which underscore the 
interplay between traditional and emergent 
informational actors in constructing public 
understanding of the political reality. Methodologically, 
we leverage Facebook URL share data, which provides 
granular attention metrics about both traditional media 
and alternative informational actors. These metrics help 
understand audience reach at the story and concept level. 
We employ text network analysis of Facebook dataset, 
while interpretively discussing the results. 
The study’s empirical context is a recent gun-
control movement in the U.S., called the March for Our 
Lives (MFOL) in 2018. The movement reached its 
momentum in the aftermath of the deadly shooting event 
at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, 
Florida. The movement became known by its social 
media hashtags #NeverAgain and #EnoughisEnough 





and the large-scale offline protests which called for 
stricter gun regulations. While the hashtags existed 
before MOFL, they quickly became synonymous with 
the movement and immediately went viral. MFOL was 
a nationwide (and to some extent, global) demonstration 
which staged one of the largest protests in American 
history [12]. This study analyzes the titles and blurbs of 
11 months of URLs shared on Facebook starting in 
February, 14, 2018, when the Parkland school shooting 
had occurred, through the rest of 2018.   
 
2. Consensus mobilization in digital age  
Consensus mobilization depends heavily on public 
and media relations. While the ability of social 
movement organizations to fundraise and manage 
resources has been an integral asset to mobilize 
consensus as well as actions, opportunity structures and 
framing structures play a particularly important role in 
understanding consensus mobilization [13]. 
2.1. Opportunity structure for mobilization 
Opportunity structures are broadly defined as 
“consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—
dimensions of the political struggle that encourage 
people to engage in contentious politics” [14]. The 
elements of opportunity structures are categorized into 
two types: “opportunities for influence (OI)” and 
“opportunities for mobilization (OM)” [15]. OI refers to 
political conditions conducive for activists to exert 
actual influence on the existing political institutional 
workings, for example openness of political elites, 
tolerance or repressive capacity of the government, 
recent policy changes, and international alliances [15].   
Meanwhile, OM refers to socio-cultural conditions 
that influence public perceptions of the movement’s 
chance for success [16]. Whereas resource mobilization 
structures pertain with resource allocation endogenous 
within and across activists’ social networks and 
organizations [17,18], OM is tied to the general public’s 
attention as an external asset that affects the outcome of 
the mobilization.  
Public attention is so essential to the success of 
social movements that activists put considerable effort 
into issuing awareness campaigns and making them 
salient in media coverage [13]. As Rucht pointed out, 
“for social movements that typically lack financial 
resources and direct access to political decision-makers, 
getting public attention and support is a major 
mechanism through which social and political change 
may be affected” [19, p. 200]. Stated differently, 
consensus mobilization depends on a communication 
infrastructure that channels public attention. Traditional 
examples are newspaper subscriptions [6,20], 
availability of local television [20], radio stations [7], 
and interpersonal social contacts [21,22,23].  
In the digital environment, protest-related posting 
activities in Twitter and Facebook have served as an 
indicator of public attention, showing that networked 
informational flow forecasted the development of onsite 
mobilization [24]. That said, they did not disentangle 
protesters’ endogenous communication activities with 
other types of information. Meanwhile, another study [9] 
examined the Facebook friendship network as a latent 
communication channel through which protest 
information could spread during the Arab Spring. 
However, their study relied on the friendship network 
data, and thus failed to gauge the extent of actual 
information flow relevant to the protest.  This study 
complements prior efforts by examining the issue-
relevant information originating from various types of 
sources in addition to protester communities. 
2.2. Networked framing 
Collective action framing addresses the ways in 
which social movement narratives are constructed. In a 
traditional social movement setting, collective action 
framing is largely controlled by activist groups that have 
financial and human resources to disseminate their 
unified slogans and symbols [25]. 
Meanwhile, the digital environment adds in the 
ever-expanding role of online publics [26,27] who 
organically share a variety of information and 
conversations that intermixes news coverage, activist 
messages, memes, catchphrases, emotions, and both 
pro- and counter-protest opinions [27,28]. This is known 
as the process of “networked framing.”  
Networked framing refers to the construction of 
multifaceted narratives of a social movement including 
both supportive and opposing narratives. The process 
not only involves activist/advocacy agents but also 
alternative informational actors in digital spaces, who 
take part in creating, processing and distributing 
information. Alternative informational actors may 
widely range across individuals, small groups, non-
traditional media sites, platform owners, non-
institutional and institutional organizations, as well as 
general public [9,10]. For example, studies of Twitter 
discourses have reaffirmed the role of ordinary, and 
even marginalized, users’ storytelling in shaping the 
outlooks of protest agendas [29]. Sometimes, networked 
framing is a contested process that presents fragmented 
frames between protest cores (i.e., seasoned activists), 
spectator peripherals (i.e., ordinary public members 
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who express opinions online), and traditional 
influentials [30]. 
During networked framing, ideas and messages 
pursued by the social movement no longer belong to the 
protest/activist organizations, but emerge and evolve as 
part of a larger digital information ecosystem. In other 
words, networked framing transcends collective action 
frames and serves as a vital process to mobilize public 
consensus.    
2.3. Intermedia network agenda-setting 
Related to networked framing, agenda-setting 
theory is one of the most established and classical 
media theories that explain how media coverage 
shapes the public’s perception of political reality. 
While the original focus of agenda-setting theory has 
been on the effect of journalist coverage on setting 
public agendas in terms of what to think about and 
how to evaluate them [5], the theory has been 
advanced to focus on and explain various aspects of 
media ecosystem. 
Especially, two theoretical advancements echo 
the process of networked framing. First, intermedia 
agenda-setting contends that media not only 
influence audiences’ agendas but also those of other 
media entities. For example, studies have 
demonstrated the influence of elite newsrooms on 
smaller news outlets’ agendas; newspapers on 
television broadcast; political advertising on 
television and press news [31]. In digital spaces, the 
interdependence between traditional news media and 
emergent media attention to public/political issues 
have been prominent [e.g., 8,31,32]. 
While most of intermedia agenda-setting 
research examined the volume of issue attention (i.e., 
how frequently an issue was covered or mentioned), 
incorporating another advancement in this theoretical 
domain –network agenda-setting model –into an 
intermedia context has proven useful to understand 
how issues are interrelated or what attributes of an 
issue are associated in media narratives and, more 
importantly, how such conceptual bundles are 
propagated across different media entities to create 
dynamic news narratives in a complex media 
ecosystem.  
Most recently, studies have demonstrated that 
fake news entities’ agenda-setting effect on carrying 
over into mainstream media (especially partisan one 
like Fox News) was stronger than fact-checking sites, 
[33]. Another related study has shown that, during the 
2016 election, the intermedia flow of misinformation 
was particularly prominent for Trump but not for 
Clinton [34].  
2.4. Summary and research questions 
The notions of networked framing and 
intermedia network agenda-setting help 
conceptualize consensus mobilization in today’s 
networked social movement. Networked framing 
perspective explains why the interplay among 
different informational actors has become vital part 
of consensus mobilization in network societies. 
Moreover, intermedia network agenda-setting model 
offers an analytic framework to systematically 
examine this interplay, with the particular focus on 
various types of media actors.   
This study’s empirical context is gun violence and 
gun-control movement in the U.S. centered around the 
case of the 2018 March for Our Lives. Based on the 
networked framing perspective and intermedia network 
agenda-setting approach, we analyze URLs that were 
publicly shared in Facebook to address the following 
research questions. 
RQ1: How has the salience of issue attributes of 
gun control movement evolved over time?  
RQ2: How have different informational actors 
framed the gun control movement? 
RQ3: How different or similar are the gun control 
movement frames across informational actor types?   
3. ‘March for Our Lives’ in context: Gun 
politics in America   
‘March for Our Lives (MFOL)’ has become a 
common moniker for the 2018 gun control movement. 
MFOL emerged after a mass shooting incident at 
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (MSD) in 
Parkland, Florida on February 14, 2018. The movement 
emerged in response to the shooting via student 
activists’ collective effort to use the hashtags 
#NeverAgain and #EnoughisEnough; host multiple 
town hall meetings, including one sponsored by a 
national media (CNN); and organize nationwide 
protests like national walkouts and March for Our Lives 
(MFOL).   
MFOL demonstration was a keynote offline event 
that became a symbol of the combined online and offline 
movement. It was a series of student-led rallies to 
advocate for stricter gun control in the United States as 
well as the proactive political engagement of young 
adults. The demonstrations took place across more than 
800 cities in the U.S. and around the world, reportedly 
becoming “one of the largest expressions of popular 
opposition in the modern era” [35]. The march in 
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Washington D.C.—the protest’s main hub—set a record 
for “the largest single-day protest in the history of the 
nation’s capital” [35]. 
While these events were the apparent components 
of the 2018 movement, the gun control movement is in 
fact deeply embedded in social, historical, and policy 
structures surrounding the nation’s gun politics. Despite 
being one of the most persistent public agendas, few 
large-scale gun-control related protests or movements 
occurred prior to MFOL. Perhaps the most recognizable 
protest before MFOL was the Million Mom March in 
2000, held in response to high-profile shooting 
incidents. While this event quickly ballooned into 70 
cities around the U.S. and drew broad media attention, 
the political agendas were unclear, resulting in little 
long-term impact. The majority of participants joined 
the march simply “out of the concerns for the safety of 
[their own] child,” and the march was devoid of political 
messaging [36]. While the first Million Mom March 
turned out hundreds of thousands of protesters, its 
second iteration mobilized only 200 protesters [36].  
One reason for the lack of a successful movement 
surrounding gun politics may be attributed to the 
divisive nature of this issue. Gun policies hinge on a 
myriad of conflicting views and issues based on 
differing interpretations of the Second Amendment. 
Legal perspectives have been mixed as well. On the one 
hand, the United States v. Warren decision reflects that 
the Second Amendment falls to active members of the 
country’s militia and thus the Second Amendment 
should be a “collective” or “state’s” right, holding “no 
barrier to gun prohibition” [37]. On the other hand, court 
decisions in the late 2000s suggest that individuals do 
hold the right to bear arms [38].  
Currently, much of the gun control debate has 
pertained to what types of guns should be restricted or 
outright banned, featuring, for example, disagreements 
over handgun restrictions and whether semi-automatic 
weapons should be banned. While semi-automatic 
weapons moved to the forefront of national issues 
following the 1989 schoolyard shooting in Stockton, 
California [37], banning certain types of weapons 
remains a contentious issue and has been one of main 
agendas for MFOL. To summarize, like other social 
movements, MFLO has risen from an intricate socio-
political history.  
                                               
1 The database developers did not indicate the national origin of each 
URL. Instead, they consider a URL belonging to a country where it 
was shared the most. 
4. Research designs  
4.2. Data preparation 
4.2.1. Data collection. We leveraged Facebook’s 
privacy-protected full URL data set [39] that was 
accessible as part of Facebook’s collaboration with 
Social Science One. Our data was derived from their 
database of URLs and attributes shared by at least 100 
times with “public” privacy settings. This allowed us to 
examine URLs that have garnered some level of public 
attention on Facebook. More importantly, this dataset is 
advantageous for capturing all headlines and blurbs of 
historic URLs including those that do no longer exist.  
We used a multi-step process, described below, to 
filter, clean, and refine data from the URL shares 
database. First, we retrieved URLs relevant to MFOL 
using a created list of keywords which were compiled 
through a snowball sample of news headlines (N = 4468) 
via a search in Nexis Uni. The final keyword list 
contained 55 words or phrases reflective of gun violence, 
gun politics, and the MFOL movement itself (e.g., 
‘neveragain,’ ‘enough is enough,’ ‘crisis actor’, ‘gun 
AND activist’, ‘gun safety’, ‘nra’, ‘town hall AND gun’, 
‘national walkout’, ‘vigil AND school’, ‘school AND 
shooting’). The time window for data collection was 
from February 14, 2018, the day of the shooting event, 
to the end of 2018.  
        Next, we reviewed 5% random samples of URLs’ 
headlines and blurbs stratified by week to further refine 
the search parameters. For example, the review process 
informed us that searching with the single keyword 
‘protest’ ended up retrieving URLs about every kind of 
protest that occurred across the globe in 2018, beyond 
the context of this study. We thus decided to retrieve the 
URLs using this single-keywords only in February and 
March when the MFOL movement was at its peak. 
Furthermore, we confined the geographical parameter to 
the U.S.1 To summarize, after filtering out false positive 
URLs, the final dataset consisted of 32,141 unique 
URLs from 3,332 different parent domains. Together, 
these URLs were shared by more than 44 million users. 
Importantly, the size of sharing users is an estimate that 
accounts for the noise added to the database as a part of 
privacy-protection procedure, called “differential 
privacy” technique [39].  To derive the value, we used 
the SVINFER python package to estimate each URL’s 




4.2.2. Text mining. Each URL’s headline and blurb 
combined into a ‘document’. The NLTK python 
package was used to standardize documents including 
lowercasing, removing stop words, punctuation, and 
lemmatization. We then reviewed lists of bigrams and 
trigrams and their frequency distributions, 
concatenating conceptually similar trigrams occurring 
more than 500 times and bigrams occurring more than 
200 times. 
 
4.2.3. Informational actor types. To compare different 
informational actors, we manually annotated the parent 
domain of each of 3,332 URLs into one of the five 
categories. The five categories were defined based on 
prior works [11, 40], with the inter-coder reliability 
Kappa = .811.  
(1) Offline-based news media: websites of 
traditional press and broadcast media outlets that begun 
its operation as offline media entities (e.g., cnn.com, 
abcnews.go.com, nytimes.com) or websites affiliated 
with media conglomerates such as USAToday, Scripps, 
McClatchy, and Sinclair (e.g., columbiatribune.com) 
(2) Partisan sites: partisan and hyper-partisan sites 
that exist only online, either run as an organization or as 
a personal/small group site. We also included adversary 
state-run media that sometimes spread highly divisive 
contents (e.g., huffpost.com, thegatewaypundit.com, 
redstate.com, rt.com). 
(3) Nonpartisan sites: online-only nonpartisan 
websites of which primary purpose is to create and 
provide information not immediately echoing partisan 
ideology (e.g., cnet.com, lifehacker.com) 
(4) Advocacy-related organizations: websites run 
by organizations or groups that aim for advocacy, 
activism, movement, social change, or other political 
participation interests (e.g., nratv.org, change.org) 
(5) Social media/aggregate services: social media, 
news aggregator or portal sites whose main function is 
to aggregate and deliver content created by other sites or 
users (e.g., youtube.com, yahoo.com, reddit.com) 
(6) Others: un-codifiable by the above categories 
(e.g., fbi.gov, amazon.com) or inaccessible broken 
links 2  (e.g., americantouch.us). This category was 
excluded from further analysis. 
 
4.2.4. Text networks. We built five networks, 
representing each of the informational actor types. A 
network object was composed of two sets of data: words 
as nodes and co-occurrences of pairs of words as edges. 
For consistency, we applied the same node-list to all 
network objects.  
                                               
2 We manually investigated to trace the identity of a broken link as 
much as possible. For example, some websites did not operate any 
A node-list represented all actor types in a balanced 
way. Specifically, within each actor type, we computed 
the document frequency of every word, then selected the 
top 200 words. Many of these words overlapped across 
the informational actor types. After de-duplication and 
removal of generic words (e.g., ‘go’, ‘since’, ‘let’, ‘say’), 
days and numbers (e.g., monday, three, year), and words 
that were hard to interpret (e.g., de, la, el); the final 
combined node-list contained 255 words. We then 
created a weighted edge-list for each informational actor 
type. The edge weight Eij was defined as the number of 
documents that contained both words i and j (co-
occurrence).   
Most words co-occurred at least once across all five 
networks, resulting in an unusually high density rate ( > 
0.9, based on an unweighted graph). After manually 
reviewing the raw data, we learned that some blurbs 
included extremely long text that aggregated numerous 
headlines, creating an edge for almost every pair of 
nodes. Existence of these random edges would hinder 
interpretation of the semantic relationships in a 
meaningful way. Accordingly, we regenerated the 
graphs with edges whose weights were 50 or higher, 
meaning that a pair of words should appear together at 
least in 50 documents (headline + blurb) to be included 
as an edge in the network.   
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table 1 summarizes the number of unique parent 
domains, URLs, and words belonging to each 
informational actor type. The traditional media category 
included the highest number of unique domains 
(N=1,083) and accounted for the largest number of 
URLs spread in Facebook (N= 12,042). Partisan sites 
(N=262) and social media/aggregate services (N=60) 
contained fewer domains yet their URLs were widely 
shared (N = 6,392; N=4,162). Also, although not widely 
shared, there were many domains (N=336) that were 
inaccessible (Other).  
 
Table 1. Number of parent domains and URLs 
in each informational source type. 
Sources  Parent domains URLs Words 
trd 1,083 12,042 25,807 
par 292 6,394 20,467 
more -thus broken link – but continued to provide their content via a 
third-party platform like Facebook page. The un-codifiable category 
was applied only when our manual investigation led nowhere.  
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npar 960 5,724 22,959 
adv 601 2,558 14,944 
sm/a 60 4,162 18,908 
other 336 1,262 7,524 
Total N 3,332 32,141 54,212 
Note: trad = traditional media; par = partisan sites; npar 
=nonpartisan sites; adv = advocacy-related 
organization; sm/a = social media/aggregate services. 
 
While we did not conduct a systematic analysis 
with the ‘Other’ category, messages contained in URLs 
originating from this category were often highly 
conspiratorial and polarizing. For instance, a notorious 
conspiracy theory that student activists were crisis 
actors was mentioned in several broken URLs, such as 
“The arrogant left doesn't even bother to tell their crisis 
actors to stay off TV…” from the inaccessible site 
rickwells.us. Instead, the crisis actor-conspiracy theory 
mentioned in other source types often reputed the claim, 
for example, “A Florida state representative fired one 
of his aides on Tuesday after the man sent an email to a 
reporter‚ claiming students who spoke on TV about the 
Parkland school massacre were crisis actors” from 
nypost.com.  
5.2. Overtime trend of selected words  
Figure 1 visualizes the trends of public attention 
(RQ1) based on the weekly proportion of a selected 
keyword’s document frequency of three representative 
topics.  The Figure 1 topics include: (1) the triggering 
event (Parkland shooting), (2) the MFOL movement, 
and (3) general gun politics. We selected keywords:  
(1) ‘parkland_shoot,’ ‘school_shoot,’ ‘victim,’ and 
‘nikolas_cruz’ (the perpetrator) to represent the trigger 
event;  
(2) ‘david_hogg’ (a leading activist), ‘enough_enough’ 
(slogan), ‘march_life’ (MFOL), and ‘protest’ to 
represent the MFOL movement itself; and 
(3) ‘congress’, ‘firearm’, ‘gun_law’, ‘gun_safety’, and 
‘national_rifle_association’ to represent gun politics.  
The overtime trends show that public attention 
shifted from the triggering issue (1-3 weeks) to the 
MFOL movement (4-8 weeks), which coincided with 
the peak time of offline protest. That said, the movement 
slogan “enough_enough” had a steadfast presence 
throughout the year, alluding to activists’ struggle to 
maintain the movement’s salience. Meanwhile, gun 
politics-related keywords continued to present, 
suggesting that the movement was successful in 
sustaining the gun regulation issue as an enduring public 
agenda.   
 
Figure 1. Weekly Proportions of Document 




5.3. Text network analysis 
To understand networked framing by different 
information sources (RQ2), we compared text network 
structures for each information source type. The number 
of nodes (words) included in text network analysis was 
255. Table 2 compares the network structural 
characteristics among the five graphs. The text network 
structures for each information source type are 
visualized in Figure 2. 
 
5.3.1. Traditional media. The traditional media 
category accounted for the largest portion of edges, 
implying that it offered the richest narrative of the issue. 
Traditional media reported considerable details about 
the triggering event by focusing on locations (e.g., 
Florida, parkland, school) and stakeholders (e.g., police, 
victim, teacher), while also expanding the scope of 
attention toward other shooting events and politician 
responses toward gun violence (e.g., trump, official, 
republican). For instance, the headline of a Tampa Bay 
Times article stated: “Moments after the shooting at a 
Broward County high school on Wednesday, President 
Donald Trump offered Florida any federal assistance 
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needed, the White House said.” Similarly, an article 
from the Washington Post reported: “The president 
framed the mass shooting...as indicative of a mental-
health issue, rather than a gun-control problem.” Many 
URLs originating from traditional media followed a 
journalistic writing style based on factual reporting and 
delivering the response of political elites and notable 
activists to the accident and the movement. 
 
Table 2. Network structure characteristics 
  trd par npar adv sm/a 
Node 255 255 255 255 255 
Edge 829 242 238 83 31 
Edge 
weight 86.30 70.17 66.08 86.161 64.30 
Degree 17.09 4.70 4.18 0.55 1.50 
Weighted 
degree  1475.03 329.73 275.90 47.27 96.16 
Density  0.18 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Note: The values are based on filtered graphs with edge 
weight 50 and higher; trad = traditional media; par = 
partisan sites; npar = nonpartisan sites; adv = 
advocacy-related organization; sm/a = social 
media/aggregate services. 
 
5.3.2. Partisan sites. Partisan sites centered around the 
contestation between democrats and republicans. For 
instance, a left-wing source (bipartisanreports.com) 
stated: “Every time there is a mass shooting involving 
students in America, we collectively hope that this time 
will be different. We hope that something will break the 
usual cycle of grief, anger, condolences, and inaction by 
Republican politicians. When the attention fades, 
Republicans take the opportunity....” In contrast, a right-
wing source (westernjournal.com) stated, “In the wake 
of every major mass shooting, the Democrats demand 
gun control legislation be the dominant media narrative. 
They don’t mention what that legislation would actually 
entail, mostly because what they propose would either 
a) not work, b) violate the Constitution or c) both.”     
Furthermore, partisan sites paid closer attention to 
gun-policy issues than the shooting incident itself (e.g., 
NRA, gun_control, call, gun violence, right) with the 
then-president Trump at the center of the discussion. 
Also, David Hogg, a survivor of the MSD shooting who 
became an iconic activist, was frequently mentioned by 
partisan sites. His name was linked with words such as 
“activist, twitter, NRA,” which emphasized his role in 
the movement. For example, toprepublicanews.com 
reported that “Immediately after the Florida school 
shooting, the mainstream media was lining up to 
interview student survivor David Hogg, who condemned 
President Donald Trump and demanded gun control.” 
Many URLs originating from the partisan sites touched 
on the legitimacy of Hogg as an activist. For instance, 
“the ex-FBI agent father of one of the survivors of the 
high school shooting in Parkland, Florida, lashed out at 
conspiracy theorists who claim his son was not witness 
to the massacre but a crisis actor who shows up at 
shootings to draw media attention (rawstory.com).”;   
“Several posts about David Hogg that have surfaced in 
the wake of the shooting are being methodically purged 
from accounts that offer an alternative or critique of 




Figure 2. Text network by informational source 
type. Node size adjusted by document 
frequency; color gradation adjusted by 
weighted degree centrality. 
 
5.3.3. Non-partisan sites. Topics discussed in non-
partisan sites showed a similarity to partisan sites, 
although non-partisan sites touched upon aspects of race, 
diversity, and equity issues more frequently, situating 
gun politics in broader socio-cultural contexts. For 
instance: “Florida school shooter was a raving racist 
who hated black people, interracial coupling, Instagram 
group chat shows (atlantablackstar.com).” “Children of 
color already face violent discipline in schools. Arming 
teachers will get them killed (theintercept.com).” 
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5.3.4. Social media or aggregate Services.  Not 
surprisingly, this category drew sources from other 
types of media, resulting in resemblance to other 
categories. For example, prominent words in this 
network such as “student, Florida, people, trump, state, 
gun, report” occurred likewise prominently in other 
networks. This category drew information directly from 
other sources, for example, “NRA national 
spokesperson Dana Loesch tells ABC News' George 
Stephanopoulos the focus in the aftermath of the 
Parkland shooting should be local and FBI 
authorities…” (from ABC News Youtube Channel). 
Similarly, “Broward County sheriff says he won't resign 
amid controversy over Parkland school shooting” (from 
Fox News Youtube Channel).  
Notably, there were quite a few rumor-related 
headlines/blurbs in this category. For instance, a 
Youtube channel reported that “David Hogg, who is 
rumored to be the son of a member of the FBI, seems to 
be coached and given lines in his interview with CNN.” 
Also, Yahoo News reported, “Yet another conspiracy 
theory about student activist David Hogg circulated on 
social media on Monday and Tuesday. Boosted by 
popular right-wing blogs, the stories falsely allege that 
the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School student 
wasn't on campus when the Parkland, Florida, shooting 
broke out.” 
 
5.3.5. Advocacy-related organizations. This category 
heavily centered around gun regulation, reflecting both 
pro- and anti-gun control viewpoints. Prominent words 
such as “congress, gun_control, bill, state, law, sign” 
reflected that organizations called either for protecting 
the Second Amendment or enhancing gun control.  For 
instance, the National Association for Gun Rights 
(nagr.org) posted that “After the shooting in Parkland, 
FL, anti-gunners are on the warpath to send our Second 
Amendment rights through a shredder!” In contrast, an 
activist organization posted that “the Florida Senate has 
voted to support a number of new gun control measures 
following the massacre at Marjory Stoneman Douglas 
High School in Parkland, Florida (democracynow.org).” 
That is, both perspectives existed in the dataset.  
         Efforts to mobilize support and help for a certain 
group (e.g., student, faculty, schools) were salient in this 
category. For example, a MSD alumni group raised an 
online fundraising campaign with this blurb: 
“Mobilizing MSD Alumni is a group of more than 
11,500 alumni of Marjory Stoneman Douglas High 
School. We were formed in the aftermath of the mass 
shooting at MSD on February 14th, 2018, with the 
intention of supporting current students and faculty, as 
well as to help advocate for change.” 
5.4. Text network correlations 
Three different correlation metrics were compared 
to understand how similar --or different --the five text 
networks are (RQ3), including rank correlations of 
degree centrality, rank correlations of document 
frequency, and quadratic assignment procedure (QAP)-
based network correlations. The results (Table 3) show 
that advocacy-related organizations were least 
correlated with the rest of graphs, implying the 
distinctive role that this category has in the process of 
consensus mobilization.  
Meanwhile, partisan and non-partisan networks 
showed the highest correlations across all three metrics, 
implying that their narrative patterns were more similar 
to each other compared to other source types. The text 
network of social media and aggregate services showed 
high correlation with traditional media, partisan, and 
nonpartisan sites based on the document frequency, and 
its correlation with partisan and nonpartisan sites still 
remained strong when tested by degree centrality and 
QAP. This result is not a surprise given that social 
media/aggregate services mostly deliver information 
from other source types rather than creating their own.  
 
Table 3. Correlations among Informational 
Source Type Networks 
Rank correlations: Document frequency 
 1 2 3 4 
1.Traditional      
2. Partisan  0.603    
3. Nonpartisan  0.657 0.781   
4. Social/aggregate  0.740 0.774 0.765  
5. Advocacy  0.415 0.404 0.554 0.430 
Rank correlations: Degree centrality  
 1 2 3 4 
1.Traditional      
2. Partisan  0.481    
3. Nonpartisan  0.490 0.674   
4. Social/aggregate  0.420 0.575 0.567  
5. Advocacy  0.080 0.093 0.162 0.165 
QAP-based network correlation 
 1 2 3 4 
1.Traditional      
2. Partisan  0.397    
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3. Nonpartisan  0.412 0.571   
4. Social/aggregate  0.261 0.472 0.488  
5. Advocacy 0.073 0.110 0.107 0.430 
Note: Rank correlations based on Spearman’s Rho test; 
all significant at p < .001 
6. Conclusion and discussions  
This paper explored consensus mobilization of the 
U.S. gun control movement on Facebook during MFOL.  
Becoming an essential part of the process of consensus 
mobilization in digital age, networked framing involves 
not just activists and sympathizers but also alternative 
informational actors who have a say –both supportive 
and opponent –about the issue at hand. This study took 
advantage of the researchers’ access to the entire 
Facebook URLs share database and analyzed the data 
using the intermedia network agenda-setting model 
framework. The comprehensive access to this dataset 
allowed us to go beyond just studying protester 
communities, and enabled a comparative analysis of 
intermedia flow of issue attributes used to frame gun 
violence, gun politics, and the 2018 MFOL movement.  
This project contributes to the literature by 
intersecting social movement’s consensus mobilization 
and intermedia network agenda-setting. The findings 
demonstrate the complex framing of gun control 
movement in today’s hybrid media environment. Based 
on the findings, we offer a few insights.  
First, traditional media has still been a central 
framing machine reassuring the importance of news 
coverage in consensus mobilization. In our study, 
offline-based news media category showed the most 
dynamic movement narratives. By reporting the trigger 
event closely, traditional media set the ‘tone’ of the 
nation, which was helpful in creating opportunity 
structures for the movement. Second, the narratives of 
partisan sites reflected the political battle over 
“opportunities for influence” [15]. Meanwhile, non-
partisan sites’ narratives embraced race, gender, and 
equity issues. That is, nonpartisan information sources 
connected MFOL to existing identity politics and power 
struggles. This way of framing helped the movement 
organizers expand their “opportunities for mobilization” 
[15]. by broadening their sympathizer bases. Lastly, 
advocacy/activism organizations and groups seemed to 
play a unique role in networked framing. They were the 
most informative in terms of gun regulation agendas and 
mindful to spillover consensus into actions. That said, 
the correlation between them and other media entities 
also alludes a possibility of failing to incorporating 
activist agendas into more visible media narratives. 
More investigation would be helpful to interpret what it 
means that activists network agenda showed the lowest 
correlation among all types of informational actors.   
7. Limitations  
While this study comprehensively addresses the 
digital information ecosystem centered on Facebook, 
we examined networked framing without considering 
how extensively Facebook publics engaged with these 
frames. By considering the extent of user engagements, 
future research should be able to capture the degree of 
public attention more accurately as well as the level of 
virality in different frames and narratives. Also, while 
we took the intermedia network agenda-setting 
framework, we did not test temporal agenda flows from 
one media type to another. Thus, our results address 
similarities yet not causality. Lastly, we used Facebook 
URL to focus on intermedia framing among various 
informational providers, other data source like Twitter 
would help expand the scope of investigation by 
including ordinary public users’ conversations.  
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